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THE REPERCUSSIONS OF LOSING THE RIGHT
TO RESPOND: WHY MATCHING FUNDS
SHOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL FOR JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS EVEN AFTER ARIZONA FREE
ENTERPRISE CLUB'S FREEDOM CLUB PAC V
BENNETT
J. Alexandra Gonzales*
The balance between preventing corruption and protecting a
speaker's First Amendment rights has long been a source of conflict in
campaign finance jurisprudence. However, as examination of some
recent cases in this area reveal, the United States Supreme Court has
placed much more emphasis on the First Amendment than the concern
for corruption. While this may be justifiable for political elections, it
proves to be very problematic for judicial elections.
In the Supreme Court's latest case on campaign finance, Arizona
Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,' the Court
invalidated Arizona's matching funds provision for state political
elections as a violation of the First Amendment.4 Matching funds (also
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2013.
1. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
2. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. _, _,130 S. Ct. 876, 876-77
(2010) (holding that restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations violate
the First Amendment), and Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788
(2002) (holding that speech by judicial candidates during an election is protected
under the First Amendment), with Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(holding restrictions on corporate contributions or expenditures are permitted in
order to curb the corruptive influence of corporate money in campaigns). Much of
the shift can be attributed both to the expenditure and contribution distinction that
dates back to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and the rise of
corporate participation, and protection, in elections. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
130 S. Ct. at 910.
3. _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
4. Id at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
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called "trigger funds" or "rescue funds"),5 typically consist of additional
funds provided to a publicly financed candidate when a self-financed or
6
privately-financed opponent spends above a certain trigger threshold.
The Court found that because these funds were triggered as a direct result
of someone else's speech, the choice independent groups and privately-
financed candidates had to make, to either speak and risk triggering the
funds to their opponent or not speak at all, was incredibly burdensome.7
Moreover, the Court held that the interests in leveling the electoral
opportunities for candidates and preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption were not sufficient to justify the burdens these matching
funds placed on privately-financed candidates and independent groups.
The Court references the North Carolina matching funds
provision in a footnote,9 sharply suggesting the provision is
unconstitutional.'o However, one noticeable difference between the
Arizona matching funds provision and the North Carolina provision, that
the Court also seems to subtly recognize, is that the North Carolina
provision applied to judicial elections." Regardless of one's feelings
5. See Eric H. Wexler, Comment, A Trigger Too Far?: The Future of Trigger
Funding Provisions in Public Campaign Financing After Davis v. FEC, 13 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 1141, 1143 (2011).
6. Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 288-89 (2010). Some matching fund provisions also
provide funds when independent expenditures are spent on behalf of the privately-
financed candidate or against the publicly funded candidate. Id.
7. Bennett, U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2819-20.
8. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
9. Id. at n.3, 131 S. Ct. at 2816 n.3.
10. See Friday Interview: Supreme Court Ruling Should Impact N.C.
Elections, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.carolinajoumal.com/
exclusives/display exclusive.html?id=8128 ("[I]t's very clear. North Carolina's
matching-fund provisions are unconstitutional.").
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2011). But see Election Law & Policies:
Notice, N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.ncsbe.gov/content.aspx?id=56
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011) ("By order of the State Board on December 22, 2011 as a
result of the Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.
Ct. 2806 (2011) ruling by the United States Supreme Court, the matching funds and
reporting provisions as to public financing of appellate judicial races as set out in GS
163-278.66(a) and GS 163-278.67 are no longer implemented."). North Carolina has
a separate statute, the Voter-Owned Election Act, which provides matching funds for
the offices of Council of State offices of Auditor, Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and Commissioner of Insurance. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.95-
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about campaign finance in the political realm, the Court's decision in
Bennett, coupled with its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,12 pose significant troubles and concerns about the
increasing influence of wealth in judicial elections in general and North
Carolina in particular.14  Many scholars have addressed the
constitutionality of the North Carolina matching funds provision for
judicial elections with mixed outcomes." However, few arguments
separate the analysis of matching funds for political elections from those
99B (2011). Arizona's statute, however, provided funds for the state legislature (both
House and Senate), mine inspector, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction,
corporation commission, secretary of state, attorney general, or Governor. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-950(D) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). The Judicial Campaign
Reform Act, however, is separate under section 163-278.67 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina. See also Tom Breen, N.C. campaign spending law challenged,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 13, 2011, available at http://www.news-
record.com/content/2011/09/13/article/nc
campaign spendinglaw challenged ("North Carolina's law also primarily applies
to candidates for judicial office, although in 2008 it was expanded to include races
for state auditor, insurance commissioner and superintendent of public instruction.").
12. 558 U.S. ___ , 130 S. Ct. 876, 876-77 (2010) (holding that restrictions
on independent expenditures by corporations violate the First Amendment).
13. See Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualfi cation After Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Company: What's Due Process Got to Do with It?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV.
368, 368 (2011) ("The influence of special-interest money on judicial elections may
be the greatest threat to the public's continued trust in the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary.").
14. See Gene Nichol, Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C., Dir., Ctr. On Poverty
Work & Opportunity, An Intersection of Laws: Citizens United v. FEC: Citizens
United and the Roberts Court's War on Democracy, Speech at Georgia State
University Law Review Symposium (Summer 2011), in 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1007,
1013, 1016-18. See also Citing Unique Role of Judges, Groups Urge Court to
Uphold Public Finance Law, JUSTICE AT STAKE (June 17, 2011), http://www.
justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press-releases- 1 6824/?citing unique role ofjudges
groups urgecourt toupholdpublic financelaw&show=news&newslD=10903
(arguing that the Wisconsin court should uphold trigger funds for judicial elections
because of unique role of judges and that such a decision could impact North
Carolina elections as well).
15. See generally Jason Bradley Kay & Jack McDaniel Sawyer, The
Constitutionality of "Rescue Fund Triggers" in North Carolina's Judicial Campaign
Reform Act, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 267 (2004) (arguing that these matching funds
are unconstitutional); see also Wexler, supra note 5, at 1188-89 (written before the
Bennett decision predicting that the Court would uphold matching funds).
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for judicial elections.16 Such a coupled approach assumes that these
elections are the same with regard to the nature of the election, the
speech involved, and the consequences of not having the right to
respond. This analysis is not misguided, as the Court has appeared to
treat judicial and political elections as the same.
However, subtle indications in two cases involving judicial
elections suggest that the Court, although considering judicial and
legislative elections to be substantially similar, may consider corruption
and its impact to be the slight difference between judicial elections and
political elections. 9 Such an approach allows for distinguishing these
20
elections based on the nature of the election, the speech involved, and
the consequences of not having the right to respond.21 Because of the
similarities in the perception and ramifications of corruption in political
16. Most articles choose to group North Carolina's matching funds for judicial
elections with other state provisions that do not provide for matching funds for
judicial elections. See George LoBiondo, Note, Pulling the Trigger on Public
Campaign Finance: The Contextual Approach to Analyzing Trigger Funds, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1743, 1753-55 (2011); see also Wexler, supra note 5, at 1156.
But see James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections:
Davis, White, and the Future ofJudicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENv. U. L. REV.
195, 196 (2008) (arguing that matching funds for judicial elections of the type in
North Carolina are unconstitutional prior to the Court's ruling in Bennett).
17. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-83 (2002).
18. See id.; see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
19. See Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, Speech and Elections: The
Caperton Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, 2008-09 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319,
341 (2008-09) ("The difference between the judicial and legislative functions is a
weak distinction for finding that independent expenditures that cannot create a threat
of quid pro quo in a legislator must create a direct, personal or pecuniary interest in a
judge.").
20. See Erwin Chemerinsky & James Sample, Stanching the Cash Flow, AM.
PROSPECT, Oct. 2011, at 51-52 (noting the "special nature of judicial elections" and
that "there is reason to believe that even the Roberts Court might recognize that
judicial elections are different from others").
21. See Brief for Common Cause in Wisconsin, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 23, Wis. Right to Life PAC v. Brennan, No. I1-
1769 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that by ensuring the right to respond in judicial
elections, it incentivizes participation in public funding, which in turn leads to the
appearance of an impartial judiciary).
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and judicial elections,2 the Court's analysis of campaign finance
regulations in general,23 and of matching funds in particular,24 should be
21different for judicial elections than for political elections. Moreover,
the analysis of the effect of matching funds on the campaign itself should
also be different for judicial elections.26
One scholar argues that, because the Court's most recent
27decision on judicial elections correctly accounted for both the First
Amendment and due process concerns at issue, it
reflects a realpolitik grounding that ought to extend
to making the constitutional case for a whole range
of legitimate judicial campaign finance regulation,
including, for instance, so-called "trigger matching
funds" in response to independent expenditures
supportive of a candidate's adversary in the
growing number of states adopting public financing
28
systems for their elected judiciaries.
While that argument focuses on expenditure limits in judicial elections
generally,29 this Note seeks to expand and apply it to matching funds
specifically. Particularly, this Note argues that preserving the right to
respond through these matching funds in judicial elections helps achieve
22. See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 19, at 339 (noting that the corruption
standard from Buckley and the bias standard as noted in Caperton are "strikingly
similar").
23. See James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of Fourth and Fourteenth:
Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 727, 730
(2011).
24. See Citing Unique Role ofJudges, supra note 14.
25. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 805 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26. See Jason D. Grimes, Note, Aligning Judicial Elections With Our
Constitutional Values: The Separation of Powers, Judicial Free Speech, and Due
Process, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 863, 866 (2009) ("In the post-White era, judicial
candidates are emboldened to proclaim their views on the campaign trail, which
impedes the appearance and reality of impartiality when deciding cases related to
such matters."(footnote omitted)).
27. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
28. Sample, supra note 23, at 732 (footnote omitted). But see Bopp & Neeley,
supra note 16, at 196 (arguing that matching funds for judicial elections are
unconstitutional).
29. See Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
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an impartial judiciary, a compelling state interest sufficient to survive
strict scrutiny.30 This Note also argues that while the footnote referencing
the North Carolina matching funds strongly suggests the
unconstitutionality of the North Carolina matching funds provision,32 the
provision may, and should, be constitutional for North Carolina's judicial
elections33 as well as in other states that provide matching funds for
judicial elections.34 Although many of the states that provide matching
funds for judicial elections, including North Carolina, have since
indicated that matching fund provisions will not be implemented for the
2012 elections because of the Court's decision in Bennett,3 5 this Note
argues that such provisions should not be repealed.
Section I examines the Court's definition of corruption in
political elections that is reaffirmed in Bennett. It also describes the
30. See White, 536 U.S. at 774-75 (stating that strict scrutiny will apply to
speech "about the qualifications of candidates for public office"). The Court has
indicated that judicial elections are still electoral processes and as such, campaign
speech is still a fundamental First Amendment right. See id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). As indicated in her dissent in White, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
however, does not agree with the notion that "an election is an election," and as
such, speech may be treated differently in judicial elections than from speech in
political ones. Id.
31. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, U.S.
n.3, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2816 n.3 (2011).
32. See Friday Interview, supra note 10.
33. See Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 52. But cf N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-278.95-99B (2011) (providing matching funds for the offices of Council of
State offices of Auditor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commissioner of
Insurance under the Voter-Owned Election Act).
34. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19A-1 to 1-19A-17 (West Supp. 2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-12-1 to 3-12-17 (LexisNexis 2011); Wis. STAT. §§ 11.50-11.522
(2010) (repealed 2011); see also Wexler, supra note 5, at 1152 n.87.
35. See Election Law & Policies: Notice, supra note 11 (noting that the North
Carolina State Board of Elections will not issue matching funds for North Carolina
judicial elections in 2012); see also Lawrence Messina, Funding setback, recent
ruling scale down W Va. public funding pilot for Supreme Court races, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 30, 2011, available at http://bdtonline.com/local/xl607580178/Capital-
Focus-W-Va-attempts-scaled-down-candidate-funding-pilot/print (noting that the
attorney general of West Virginia has since concluded that the decision in Bennett
"nixes" the matching funds provision for West Virginia judicial elections in 2012).
See also Viveca Novak, Under the Influence, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2011, at 39
(indicating that Wisconsin recently had to eliminate all public financing for judicial
elections because of budget constraints).
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Court's definitions of impartiality from Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, and its perception of bias from Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,
arguing that the definition of corruption in the political context is
36different, but yet completely the same as in judicial elections. The
section also examines these standards and how they create issues for
evaluating the extent the influence of money has on individual judges
and the judiciary as a whole. Both the concern for quid pro quo
corruption and the corruptive influence of money in judicial elections are
part of the compelling state interest in preserving the impartiality of the
judiciary. Section II examines the matching funds at issue in Bennett
and the Court's rejection of their validity as a means of combating
corruption or the appearance of corruption.38 It also examines the North
Carolina matching funds provision for judicial elections and the purposes
behind it. Further, the section compares the North Carolina provision in
both content and purpose to those found in other states that had matching
fund provisions for judicial elections. Section III argues that preserving
the appearance of impartiality both during and after the election through
the right to respond does not burden the speech of individuals or groups
who wish to spend during the election. Instead, it burdens judicial
candidates and potential litigants and, as a result, defeats the purpose and
function of the judiciary. Section IV concludes that given the
consequences not having the right to respond has on the impartiality of
the judiciary, matching funds not only satisfy the compelling state
interest, but they are necessary to preserving that interest.
36. See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 19, at 339 (noting that the Court's
description of bias in Caperton "seems strikingly similar" to the definition of
corruption in Buckley).
37. See Citing Unique Role ofJudges, supra note 14.
38. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, U.S ,_
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011).
2012] 515
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I . CORRUPTION
A. Corruption in Political and Judicial Elections
The distinction the Supreme Court made between contributions
and expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo, 39 has come to shape campaign
finance regulation and jurisprudence.40 The Court in Buckley defined
corruption as quid pro quo and found that:
[C]ontribution limitation focuses precisely on the
problem of large campaign contributions-the
narrow aspect of political association where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been
identified-while leaving persons free to engage in
independent political expression, to associate
actively through volunteering their services, and to
assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent
in supporting candidates and committees with
financial resources. Significantly, the Act's
contribution limitations in themselves do not
undermine to any material degree the potential for
robust and effective discussion of candidates and
campaign issues by individual citizens,
associations, the institutional press, candidates, and
41political parties.
Thus, the Court makes a clear distinction between expenditures and
contributions in campaigns and the corresponding likelihood of, and
42
concern for, corruption. The Supreme Court and lower courts have
continued to adhere to this distinction, holding that because independent
39. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
40. See E. Stewart Crosland, Note, Failed Rescue: Why Davis v. FEC Signals
the End to Effective Clean Elections, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2009)
(citing David R. Ortiz, The First Amendment and the Limits of Campaign Finance
Reform, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SoURCEBOOK 91, 92 (2005) (stating that
the per curiam opinion of Buckley "created constitutional guidelines that continue to
oversee campaign finance regulations")).
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29.
42. Id.
516
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expenditures are not connected with the candidate, there is not a concern
43for quid pro quo corruption, and as such, cannot be limited 3. However,
because contributions to candidates are directly connected, there is a
greater concern for quid pro quo corruption, and thus such contributions
can be regulated and limited.44
As evidenced in cases such as Austin v. Michigan State Chamber
of Commerce45 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 4 the
Court has wavered in its definition of corruption.47 It appeared as though
the concern about corruption in those cases was about the corruptive
influence of massive amounts of money, particularly from corporations,
48
and the appearance that could have on and in the democratic system.
Thus, corruption can have two faces: that of quid pro quo and that of the
corruptive influence of substantial amounts of money, particularly
49
corporate money.
As evidenced in Bennett, the Court has re-narrowed its definition
50
of corruption in the political context to once again mean quid pro quo.
43. Id. See also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct. 876,
910 (2010).
44. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29.
45. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S.
Ct. 876.
46. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct.
876.
47. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 991-92 (2011) (noting the Court's
consideration of the corruptive influence of large amounts of money on the outcomes
in the election as well as the distortive impact on issues).
48. See id. at 992. See also Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 ("We therefore have
recognized that 'the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption
support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the
corporate form."' (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 500-01
(1985))).
49. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 ("Our treatment of contribution restrictions
reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It
also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits-
interests in preventing 'both the actual corruption threatened by large financial
contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through
the appearance of corruption."' (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197, 208 (1982))).
50. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, _ U.S. ,
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826-27 (2011).
517
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And corruption or the appearance of corruption is not considered to be a
legitimate compelling state interest that justifies placing limitations on
independent expenditures in political elections. 5 ' The Court has reasoned
that independent expenditures are, by definition, political speech that is
presented to the electorate and that is considered independent and not
52
coordinated with the candidate. As such, this separation between the
speaker and the candidate negates the risk of quid pro quo corruption.5 3
Moreover, the Court has also held that when the speaker is the candidate,
there is no risk of quid pro quo corruption.54 In Davis v. Federal Election
Commission, the Court struck down the "Millionaire's Amendment"
that allowed for additional funds to a candidate when his or her opponent
spent from personal funds. 6 The Court held that because the candidate's
use of his or her own funds could not lead to quid pro quo corruption
with himself or herself, the provision did not serve a compelling state
interest.57 Thus, because of the disconnect and the fact that it is direct
speech expressed through an expenditure,58 the Court has continually
held that preventing corruption through the regulation of such
expenditures is not a sufficient government interest to suppress speech.59
The concerns and justifications for regulating expenditures in
judicial elections, although facially different than those expressed for
political elections, are in actuality, completely the same.60 Two Supreme
51. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2826.
52. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2826 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010)).
53. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
54. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740-41 (2008).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 729, 740.
57. See id. at 738-41.
58. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-40, 47-48 (1976) (per curiam)
(holding that because independent expenditures are expressions of core political
speech, they cannot be limited).
59. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, U.S.
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826-27 (2011).
60. See Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak Up, Must You Stand Down:
Caperton and Its Limits, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1334 (2010) (citing
Hoersting & Smith, supra note 19, at 340).
[Vol. 10518
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Court cases illustrate and shape how both speech and corruption are to be
61
regulated, or not regulated, within the context of judicial elections.
62In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court held that
the First Amendment applies to protect the right of judicial candidates to
express their views on disputed legal issues during a campaign.63 The
Court held Minnesota's "announce clause,"6 which prohibited
candidates for judicial office from "'announc[ing] his or her views on
legal or political issues,"' 65 to be an unconstitutional burden on speech
66
under the First Amendment. The Court rejected the proposed state
interest in preserving the impartiality or appearance of impartiality in the
judiciary under three different definitions of impartiality.67 The Court
defined impartiality as: (1) "lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding";68 (2) "lack of a preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view";69 and (3) "openmindness" to the views and
arguments at issue.70 The Court noted that it considered the "root
meaning"7 of impartiality to be "the lack of bias for or against either
party to the proceeding" 72 and acknowledged that while the announce
clause at issue in White was "barely tailored to serve",73 the state interest
of impartiality with regards to each party, it did "not disagree"74 that the
state had an interest in this form of impartiality."
Although White is often read as the Court's indication that it
76
considers judicial elections to be the same as political elections, the
61. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002);
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
62. 536 U.S. 765.
63. Id. at 788.
64. Id. at 770.
65. Id. at 768, 770 (quoting Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)).
66. Id. at 788.
67. Id. at 775-78.
68. Id. at 775.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 778.
71. Id. at 775.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 776.
74. Id. at 777 n.7.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 781-83.
519
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Court suggests that the difference between judicial and legislative
elections is minimal, not as "greatly exaggerate[d]" 77 as Justice Ginsburg
78
suggests in her dissent. The Court appears to subtly suggest that the
difference between them is small, not that a difference does not exist.
Another indication of the Court's subtle recognition of the difference
between the two types of elections, even if minimally so, is found in the
Court's statement that "we neither assert nor imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as
those for legislative office." 7 9 Thus, the Court indicates that although it
treats judicial elections the same as legislative ones with regard to
candidate speech, it may encounter situations where "the First
Amendment allows greater regulation of judicial election campaigns than
legislative election campaigns."80 And so, the Court seems to
acknowledge that if the speech involved in a judicial election resulted in
bias for or against a party to the proceeding, thus defeating the
impartiality of the judge, such speech may be regulated under the First
Amendment.
The Court appeared to encounter such a situation in Caperton v.
A. T. Massey Coal Co., holding that recusal is required where there is a
"serious risk of actual bias" 82 because of substantial campaign support to
a later presiding judge.83  The Supreme Court thus implicitly
acknowledged the difference between judicial and political elections and
the impact corporate contributions and expenditures can have on the due
process rights of litigants opposing those corporations before the judge
the corporations helped elect. 84
At issue in Caperton was the money Don Blankenship spent in
helping get Brent Benjamin elected to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.85 At the time of the election, however, Blankenship's
77. Id. at 784.
78. See id.; id. at 805-806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 783 (majority opinion).
80. Id.
81. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
82. Id. at 884.
83. Id. at 884-85.
84. See Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
85. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
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company,86 A.T. Massy Coal Company, was in the process of appealing
a fifty million dollar jury verdict against it to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia.8 Blankenship gave one thousand dollars in
direct contributions to Justice Benjamin's campaign, and spent three
million dollars in independent expenditures running attack ads against
Justice Benjamin's opponent. Justice Benjamin of course won the
election, and, after refusing to recuse himself, went on to side with the
89
majority in reversing the jury verdict against Blankenship's company.
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Caperton dealt with
the issue of recusal when judges had received campaign contributions
and expenditures from litigants under the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause specifically,90 it shed light on the Court's stance on
campaign contributions and expenditures in judicial elections generally.9'
The Court concluded that recusal is required where:
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias-based on
objective and reasonable perceptions-when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case
had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent.92
Thus, the Court is seeking to ensure the appearance of an impartial judge
by requiring recusal when there is a "serious risk of actual bias."9 3
86. See id. ("Don Blankenship [was] Massey's chairman, chief executive
officer, and president.").
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 873-76.
90. See id. at 876 (noting that "most matters relating to judicial disqualification
[do] not rise to a constitutional level" (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683,
702 (1948))).
91. See Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
92. Caperton, 556 U.S. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64. See also Ronald D.
Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REv. 1, 68 (2011) (criticizing
the standard of bias set out in Caperton, saying that it "does not create a test of when
the judge must disqualify himself It simply lists various factors for the judge to
consider.").
93. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
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It is also important to remember that the Court was ultimately
concerned with both forms of Blankenship's spending: the three million
dollars in independent expenditures and the one thousand dollar direct
contribution.9 4 Some scholars argue that this concern indicates that
independent expenditures can have just as much of a corruptive influence
as contributions in the context of judicial elections95 and so can be
regulated.96 Thus, although the Court has continually held that
independent expenditures cannot be regulated for fear of corruption, the
Court proceeded to hold as much in Caperton when the election at issue
. . 97
was a judicial one.
Although the Court concedes that there was "no allegation of a
quid pro quo agreement,"98 that is exactly what the opposing litigant and
other members of the public perceived Justice Benjamin's decision in
favor of Blankenship's company to be.99 Thus, in attempting to protect
the impartiality and integrity of the judge by defining the standards for
recusal when a judge appears to be biased, the Court is essentially
attempting to prevent quid pro quo corruption or at least the appearance
of it.1* Moreover, the fact that the three million dollars was "more than
the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times
the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee,"101 suggests the Court's
concern for the influence this amount had on both the outcome of the
election and the bias Justice Benjamin showed once elected.102
James Sample argues that "Caperton makes clear that corruption
is not the only interest that justifies balancing the First Amendment
against other constitutional concerns."o 3 He claims that as part of due
94. See Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
95. See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 19, at 340-41.
96. See Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
97. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884-87.
98. Id. at 886.
99. See id. at 884-85.
100. See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 19, at 340-41 ("The holding in
Caperton ... suggests that if independent expenditures create the probability of bias,
they must also create at least the 'appearance of corruption,' that is, the possibility
that political actors will respond to the wishes of donors rather than constituents.").
101. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
102. See id. at 884.
103. Sample, supra note 23, at 769-70.
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process, litigants have a right to impartial courts.'0 Moreover,
structurally, courts have a duty to protect the impartiality, and the
appearance of impartiality, of the judicial system. 105 As such, "given
[the] compelling state interests in an impartial and independent judiciary,
expenditure limits in judicial elections meet strict scrutiny, and
appropriately balance the First Amendment with due process and
structural concerns of equally important constitutional magnitude."'0
Sample finds the expenditure-contribution distinction
"counterproductive" in judicial elections because "due process of law is
fundamental to the courts to a degree unmatched by the risk of corruption
in the constituent branches."' 07 Thus, Sample frames the notion of
impartiality of courts in terms of due process rights and structural
function of the courts,1os separating it from the notion of corruption.o
Another scholar claims that the "appearance of impropriety can be as
damaging to the integrity of the justice system as quid pro quo exchanges
between campaign supporters and judges."" 0 Thus, it seems entirely
possible to view the notion of preserving the impartiality of the courts as
preventing corruption.
Thus, "Davis and Citizens United, read together, confirm that the
prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance remains the only
'legitimate and compelling' government interest.""12 However, when
read with Caperton and White for judicial elections," 3 there is an
104. See id. at 773. See also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875 (quoting In re
Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
105. See Sample, supra note 23, at 775.
106. Id. at 782.
107. Id. at 728.
108. Id. at 774-75.
109. Id. at 771-73.
110. Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, and the Appearance of
Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign
Contributions on Judges'Decisions, 26 J. L. & POL. 359, 363 (Spring 2011).
111. But see Bopp & Neeley, supra note 16, at 231 ("One should not make the
mistake, however, of equating increases in the amount of money spent on judicial
campaigns with an increase in corruption.").
112. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1183 (citations omitted).
113. See Hoersting and Smith, supra note 19, at 345 (noting that "White makes
clear that the standard for speech in judicial elections is strict scrutiny," but that "if
the Court were ever to accept greater limits on speech in judicial elections, the seed
of such a decision will have to be planted in Caperton" (footnotes omitted)).
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additional concern for the corruptive influence of money, creating the
compelling state interest: an impartial, or the appearance of an impartial,
judiciary,'14 particularly as it pertains to a party in the litigation." 5
Moreover, the conflation of expenditures and contributions by Justice
Kennedy in Caperton suggests that both forms of spending can pose a
threat of quid pro quo corruption and contribute to the corruptive impact
of money that leads to a biased or corrupt judiciary, either of which can
suffice as a compelling state interest.116
The fear of corruption in the political context stems from the
idea that if corporations or individuals contribute massive amounts of
money to facilitate the election of a legislative or executive member,
once elected, that official will be under the control ofl or indebted to
the individuals or corporations. This appears to be what is happening
in the context of judicial elections. Both the quid pro quo corruption and
the significant influx of money into judicial elections create a biased, or
the appearance of a biased, judiciary." 9 Thus, although the Court defines
the standard of corruption in judicial elections to be facially different
from the standard in political elections,120 the standard for corruption is
114. Sample, supra note 23, at 774.
115. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
116. See Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
117. See Nichol, supra note 14, at 1011 (quoting David D. Kirkpatrick,
Lobbies' New Power: Cross Us, And Our Cash Will Bury You, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 22,
2010, at Al, available at 2010 WLNR 1385477).
118. See Monica Youn, Citizens United: The Aftermath, AM. CONST. Soc'Y
FOR L. & POL'Y, ISSUE BRIEF 6 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/
default/files/ACS Issue Brief Youn CitizensUnited.pdf ("Indeed, corporations
may be able to use their new ability to run campaign attack ads to coerce elected
officials into compliance with a particular agenda, even if the corporations never
have to make good on their threats by actually running the ads.").
119. See Citing Unique Role of Judges, supra note 14 (referring to amicus
briefs filed in Wisconsin Right to Life v. Brennan that argue that the Wisconsin court
should uphold trigger funds for judicial elections because of unique role of judges
and noting that such a decision could impact North Carolina elections as well).
120. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam) (noting
the concern for "the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for
abuse inherent in a regime"), with Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
884 (2009) (expressing concern with the "serious risk of actual bias").
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essentially the same as the standard for bias,121 because, by definition,
"an influenced judiciary is a corrupt judiciary."l22 Moreover, these
standards not only comply with the applicable definitions of impartiality
in White,in but they make such concerns compelling under White.124
Thus, both the concern for quid pro quo corruption and the corruptive
influence of copious amounts of money through independent
expenditures pose threats to the impartiality of the judiciary that are
sufficient to satisfy a compelling state interest.125 Regardless of whether
the Court considers a biased judiciary or the appearance of a biased
judiciary to be corruption, either through the influence of money or as
quid pro quo, or as a completely separate government interest, either
126
concern is a sufficient government interest to pass strict scrutiny.
II. CORRUPTION IN BENNETT AND CAPERTON
A. Bennett and Caperton
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett,127 the Supreme Court held "that Arizona's matching funds
scheme substantially burdens protected political speech without serving a
compelling state interest and therefore violates the First Amendment."128
The speech at issue was considered political speech because it concerned
121. But see Hoersting & Smith, supra note 19, at 339-41 (arguing that the
interest in preventing a biased or the appearance of a biased judiciary is a more
narrow interest than the interest in preventing corruption).
122. Jill E. Moenius, Comment, Buying Promises: How Citizens United's
Campaign Expenditures Convert Our "Impartial" Judges and Their Nonpromissory
Campaign Statements into an Indebted, Influenced, and Dependent Judiciary, 59 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1101, 1138 (2011).
123. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
124. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776-77 (2002).
125. See Citing Unique Role ofJudges, supra note 14 (arguing that Wisconsin
has a "compelling interest in using public financing to protect the integrity of its
courts and assuring that they appear 'impartial"').
126. See Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 52.
127. - U.S. _ , 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
128. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2813.
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"'speech uttered during a campaign for public office."'l 29 Thus, because
"'[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation' of our system of government,"1 30
"[f]aws that burden political speech are accordingly subject to strict
scrutiny."l31 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the "'Government [must]
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest."'l32
The provisions for Arizona's matching fundsl33 at issue were a
part of the Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act and were stated in
sections 16-952(A), (B), and (C)(4)-(5) of the Arizona Revised
Statutes.134 The matching funds were available during primary and
general elections.135 Under section 16-950(D) of the Arizona Revised
Statutes, public funding, and thus matching funds, was available for
qualified candidates for the offices of: the state legislature (both House
and Senate), mine inspector, treasurer, superintendent of public
instruction, corporation commission, secretary of state, attorney general,
or Governor.136 In exchange for the acceptance of these funds, and thus
the matching funds, candidates agreed to certain campaign restrictions
such as limiting expenditures of their personal funds, an overall
expenditure cap, and returning all unused funds. 3 1
129. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2817 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
130. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
14 (1976) (per curiam)).
131. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2817 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
___, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)).
132. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2817 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
130 S. Ct. at 898).
133. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1143. Recall that matching funds (also called
"trigger funds" or "rescue funds") typically consist of additional funds provided to a
publicly financed candidate when a self-financed or privately-financed opponent
spends (or independent expenditures are spent on the privately-financed candidate's
behalf) above a certain trigger threshold. See id.
134. See Bennett, U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2813-14.
135. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2814; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-
952(A)-(C) (2010).
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-950(D); see also Bennett, _ U.S. at ,
131 S. Ct. at 2813.
137. Bennett, _ U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2814 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-941(A), 16-941(A)(2), and 16-953).
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Section 16-952 of the Arizona Revised Statutes indicated when
matching funds were triggered during both the primary and the general
elections and how much the publicly funded candidate was allotted."
During the primary, "matching funds are triggered when a privately
financed candidate's expenditures combined with the expenditures of
independent groups made in support of the privately financed candidate
or in opposition to a publicly financed candidate exceed the primary
election allotment of state funds to the publicly financed candidate."' 39
Once the matching funds were triggered in a primary election, "each
additional dollar that a privately financed candidate spends during the
primary results in one dollar in additional state funding to his publicly
financed opponent (less a 6% reduction meant to account for fundraising
expenses)."1'40
Similarly, for general elections:
[M]atching funds are triggered when the amount of
money a privately financed candidate receives in
contributions, combined with the expenditures of
independent groups made in support of the
privately financed candidate or in opposition to a
publicly financed candidate, exceed the general
election allotment of state funds to the publicly
financed candidate. 14 1
"[Elvery dollar that a candidate receives in contributions-which
includes any money of his own that a candidate spends on his
campaign-results in roughly one dollar in additional state funding to his
publicly financed opponent." 4 2
The Court found that the burden imposed by the matching funds
provision was the "choice that confronts privately financed candidates
and independent expenditure groups"1 43 once the spending threshold has
138. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952; see also Bennett, U.S. at
131 S. Ct. at 2814.
139. Bennett, _ U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2814 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-952(A), (C)).
140. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2814.
141. Id. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952(B).
142. Bennett, U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2814.
143. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2823; Cf Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738-40
(2008) ("The burden imposed . . . on the expenditure of personal funds is not
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been crossed.144 Independent groups who wished to support a particular
candidate could only avoid triggering the matching funds by either
changing its message "from one addressing the merits of the candidates
to one addressing the merits of an issue, or refrain from speaking
altogether."l 45 This choice "contravenes 'the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy
to choose the content of his own message."'l46 Because this provision
placed a "burden on speech [that] is significantly greater . . . than in
Davis,",47 it must be "justified by a compelling state interest" 4 8 and be
"narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."l49
If such analysis is applied to judicial elections, the result is that
the burden the Court detests shifts to the judicial candidates.150 The
impact such choices have on the impartiality of the judiciary constitutes a
compelling state interest necessary to pass strict scrutiny,15 1 and thus
allow for matching funds.
B. Corruption and Matching Funds
In Bennett, the Court stuck down Arizona's matching funds
because they did not further the anti-corruption interest either directly or
indirectly.152 The State argued that the matching funds prevented
corruption "by eliminating the possibility of any quid pro quo between
private interests and publicly funded candidates by eliminating
contributions to those candidates altogether."153 But, because of the
wording of the statute and a statement once posted on the Citizens Clean
Elections Commission's website that mentioned the purpose as leveling
justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of
corruption.").
144. Bennett, U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2823.
145. Id. at ,131 S. Ct. at 2819-20.
146. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
147. Id. at 131 S. Ct. at 2820.
148. Id. at _131 S. Ct. at 2820.
149. Id. at-, 131 S. Ct. at 2817.
150. See infra Section III.A.
151. See infra Section III.A.
152. Bennett, U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
153. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2825.
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the playing field for candidates, 15 4 the Court chose to first see the
provision as an attempt to equalize funding, not the prevention of
corruption as the State argued.' The Court rejected the equalization
justification because the Court saw it as an "intrusion by the government
into the debate over who should govern."156 As the Court noted in
Bennett,15 7 Davis extinguished "any claim that trigger funding could
survive heightened scrutiny on the basis of an equalization rationale." 58
Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that by equalizing the funds in
some way could indirectly serve the anti-corruption interest.159
However, as discussed below, when examined in the context of
judicial elections, matching funds do not attempt to equalize funds, but
rather simply provide the right to respond.160 Doing so does not attempt
to equalize funding, but rather increase speech, a notion the Court flatly
rejected.161 As such, matching funds directly serve the anti-corruption
interest of preserving the impartiality of the election and the judiciary as
.162
a whole, sufficing as a compelling state interest to pass strict scrutiny.
In Bennett, Arizona also argued that equal funding "serve[d] the
compelling interest of combating corruption [or] the appearance of
corruption." The Court rejected this justification for several reasons.'
First, the Court found that under Davis, the matching funds provision
"counts a candidate's expenditures of his own money on his own
campaign as contributions, and to that extent cannot be supported by any
anticorruption interest."1 65 Also, because Arizona had such "ascetic
contribution limits, strict disclosure requirements, and the general
availability of public funding, it is hard to imagine what marginal
154. Id at n.10, 131 S. Ct. at2825 n.10.
155. Id. at ,131 S. Ct. at 2825.
156. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2826.
157. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
158. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1183.
159. Bennett, _ U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2825-26.
160. See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
161. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean & Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ.
of Cal., Irvine, Sch. of Law, Not a Free Speech Court, Isaac Marks Memorial
Lecture (Mar. 8, 2011), in 53 ARIz. L. REv. 723, 732-34.
162. See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
163. Bennett, _ U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2826.
164. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2826.
165. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2826.
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corruption deterrence could be generated by the matching funds
provision."l66 Moreover, the Court rejected the State's argument that the
matching funds "indirectly serve[] the anticorruption interest, by
ensuring that enough candidates participate in the State's public funding
system."l67 The fact that "burdening constitutionally protected speech
might indirectly serve the State's anticorruption interest, by encouraging
candidates to take public financing, does not establish the
constitutionality of the matching funds provision."168
In justifying its holding in Bennett that the burden in matching
funds lies in the fact that groups or privately-financed candidates may
not spend if the direct result would be additional funding to their
adversaries,169 the Court proclaimed that "every other court to have
considered the question after Davis"170 has reached the same conclusion.
The Court then goes on to list decisions invalidating the matching fund
provisions in Florida, Connecticut, and Minnesota. 17 However, the Court
failed to mention, either in this footnote or elsewhere in its opinion, the
matching fund provisions in New Mexico, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
166. Id at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2827 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-
905(A)(1), 941(B)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010)) ("Contributions to statewide
candidates are limited to $840 per contributor per election cycle and contributions to
legislative candidates are limited to $410 per contributor per election cycle.").
167. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2826.
168. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2826. Again it is important to note that Arizona's
provisions applied for candidates for the offices of: the state legislature (both House
and Senate), mine inspector, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction,
corporation commission, secretary of state, attorney general, or Governor, not for
judicial candidates. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-950(D) (West 2006 & Supp.
2010).
169. Bennett, _ U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2823.
170. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2823.
171. Id at , 131 S. Ct. at 2823-24. The Court references the case that
invalidated Minnesota's matching fund provision, Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356
(8th Cir. 1994), even though it was decided fourteen years before Davis, simply
because it supports its conclusion. The Court, however, neglects to reference that the
most authoritative case speaking to North Carolina's matching funds for judicial
elections is the Fourth Circuit's opinion in N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund v. Leake,
524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008), which upheld the matching funds for judicial elections.
Since this case was decided almost two months before Davis it does not fall into the
Court's categorical dismissal. Compare Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (decided May 1, 2008),
with Davis, 554 U.S. 724 (decided June 26, 2008).
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-all of which provided trigger funding in judicial elections.17 This
omission suggests the Court's subtle recognition that judicial elections
may be different from political ones, particularly with regard to matching
funds." 3
What is even more telling is that the judge at issue in Caperton,
Justice Benjamin, was an elected member of The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. 174 In 2011, in the wake of Caperton, West
Virginia passed the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public
Campaign Financing Pilot Program applicable to the 2012 elections.176
In order to curb the influence of money in judicial elections and achieve
the compelling state interest of preventing corruption and the appearance
of a biased judiciary,177 the West Virginia legislature included a
matching funds provision"' within this public financing scheme. The
attorney general of West Virginia has since indicated the Court's
decision in Bennett makes the matching fund provision invalid for the
2012 judicial elections, and thus the state will not be distributing any
matching funds. 17 9 Regardless, the fact that the Court neglected to
mention these provisions in Bennett suggests that it does not consider
matching funds in judicial elections to be comparable to the Arizona
180provision or the others that apply only to political elections.
172. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19A-1 to 1-19A-17 (West Supp. 2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-12-1 to 3-12-17 (LexisNexis 2011); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.50-
11.522 (2010) (repealed 2011); see also Wexler, supra note 5, at 1152 n.87. But see
Messina, supra note 35 (noting that the attorney general of West Virginia has since
concluded that matching funds will not be distributed in the 2012 judicial elections).
173. See Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 51 (noting that the Court's
recent campaign-finance decisions have not involved judicial decisions and that the
Court may be "more accepting of the need to limit the role of money in the selection
of judges").
174. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
175. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
176. Id. But see Messina, supra note 35.
177. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(9).
178. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-11 (e)-(g). But see Messina, supra note 35.
179. See Messina, supra note 35.
180. The author assumes that the North Carolina provision was mentioned
while the others were not because of the Fourth Circuit's case, N.C. Right to Life
Comm. Fund v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008), that upheld the matching fund
provision in North Carolina. There are no Court of Appeals decisions on the other
statutes.
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Another indication that the Court considers judicial elections to
be different from political elections is found in the Court's failure to
reference Wisconsin Right to Life PAC v. Brennan, a case in which the
federal district court in Wisconsin upheld Wisconsin's matching funds
for judicial elections.182 This decision was not only rendered after Davis,
but while Bennett was being considered by the Court.1 83 The district
court in Brennan saw the choice faced by privately-financed candidates
and independent groups to be "a tactical decision, not unlike one faced
by all contributors to a campaign regardless of the Act's matching funds
provision,"l84 and thus not burdensome to their speech. Moreover, the
court also noted the state's strong interest in promoting this public
financing scheme and its provisions in order to combat the risk of bias or
the appearance of bias that the Supreme Court warned against in
Caperton.186 The failure to mention the Brennan decision, or even its
existence, suggests that the Court in Bennett recognizes the difference
between matching funds for judicial elections and political ones that
were recognized by the court in Brennan.'8 The Court in Bennett thus
181. No. 3:09-cv-00764-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2011), http://brennan.3cdn.
net/c3ebl383d35204dcadbjm6ivikh.pdf.
182. Id. at 3. It is important to note, however, that Wisconsin recently had to
eliminate all public financing for judicial elections because of budget concerns. See
Novak, supra note 35, at 39; see also Peter Hardin, Both Sides Ask Dismissal in
Public Financing Appeal, GAVEL GRAB (July 1, 2011), http://www.gavelgrab.org/
?p=22308. It is also interesting that since public funding has been eliminated,
including the matching funds, public confidence of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has plummeted. See New Poll: Confidence in Wisconsin Supreme Court Plunges,
JUSTICE AT STAKE (July 21, 2011), http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press-
releases-i 6824/?new poll confidencein wisconsin supreme court plunges&show
=news&newslD- 11188.
183. Compare Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Ariz. Free Enter. Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett and McComish v. Bennett, _ U.S. _,131 S. Ct.
2806 (Mar. 28, 2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), with Brennan, No. 3:09-cv.-00764-
wmc.
184. Brennan, No. 3:09-cv-00764-wmc at 31.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 33.
187. See id. at 34. See also Wisconsin Right to Life PAC v. Michael Brennan,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
wisconsin right to lifepolitical action committee v. michaelbrennan/
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012) (discussing the opinion and the amicus brief the Brennan
Center filed on behalf of Common Cause in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Democracy
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appears to reference the matching funds provisions and their respective
cases that apply to political elections, not judicial ones, suggesting a
subtle, yet substantial difference between the two.
In states where matching funds apply to judicial elections, this
concern for both forms of corruption is a compelling state interest
because by curbing corruption through the right to respond, it preserves
the independence and integrity of the judicial system and their
elections. "North Carolina's Judicial Campaign Reform Act creates a
system of optional public funding for candidates seeking election to the
state's supreme court and court of appeals."'" The stated purpose of the
North Carolina Public Campaign Fund is to ensure:
[T]he fairness of democratic elections in North
Carolina and to protect the constitutional rights of
voters and candidates from the detrimental effects
of increasingly large amounts of money being
raised and spent to influence the outcome of
elections, those effects being especially
problematic in elections of the judiciary, since
impartiality is uniquely important to the integrity
and credibility of the courts. Accordingly, this
Article establishes the North Carolina Public
Campaign Fund as an alternative source of
campaign financing for candidates who
demonstrate public support and voluntarily accept
strict fund-raising and spending limits. This Article
is available to candidates for justice of the Supreme
Court and judge of the Court of Appeals in
elections to be held in 2004 and thereafter.190
Thus, the North Carolina legislature explicitly states that the key
difference between judicial and political elections is the concern for
Campaign, and the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education fund arguing
that matching funds should be constitutional for judicial elections).
188. See Brief for Common Cause, supra note 21, at 23.
189. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir.
2008).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2011).
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impartiality.1 91 As such, the legislature deems the integrity and
192
impartiality of the judiciary to be sufficient and compelling interests.
Although the justification of fairness would probably not be
considered a sufficient compelling state interest for such a restriction on
speech under Bennett'9 3 and Buckley,'94 the concern for an impartial and
independent judiciary should be considered compelling for judicial
elections.' 95 But, these reasons listed here are for the public funding of
judicial elections in general.196 There is no mention of the matching
funds in this provision. In fact, there were no stated purposes for the
matching funds.' 9 This indicates that the matching funds were used to
further this interest of an impartial judiciary and should survive strict
scrutiny.198 The Fourth Circuit noted as much in North Carolina Right to
Life Committee Fund v. Leake,' 99 holding that "North Carolina's effort to
protect this vital interest in an independent judiciary" 20 0 through the
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, _ U.S. ,
,131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011).
194. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam).
195. See Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 52 (stating that the "special
nature of judicial elections is a compelling reason" why matching funds should be
allowed for judicial elections).
196. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (stating the purpose for the
public fund for judicial elections), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (the provision
for matching funds in judicial elections). But see Election Law & Policies: Notice,
supra note 11.
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2011). But see Election Law & Policies:
Notice, supra note 11.
198. See LoBiondo, supra note 16, at 1773-74 (arguing that when determining
whether "a particular provision of a public financing statute is justified by the state's
interest in preventing corruption, courts must first ascertain the provision's purpose
within the context of the larger initiative. Where the provision does not help advance
the anticorruption strategy of the larger package, or where the entire public finance
regime fails to prevent corruption, courts should strike it down. However, where a
provision implements or facilitates the public finance regime's other sections, and
thereby serves the larger legislative package's anticorruption goals (albeit
indirectly), as trigger funds usually do, courts should uphold the provision").
199. 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 441.
[Vol. 10534
public financing system generally and matching funds in particular are
"within the limits placed on the state by the First Amendment."20 '
Similarly, West Virginia's stated purpose for the public funding
of judicial elections is to:
[E]nsure the fairness of democratic elections in this
state, protect the Constitutional rights of voters and
candidates from the detrimental effects of
increasingly large amounts of money being raised
and spent to influence the outcome of elections,
protect the impartiality and integrity of the
judiciary, and strengthen public confidence in the
202judiciary.
Thus, the West Virginia legislature also explicitly states that it is
concerned about the corruptive impact of the substantial amounts of
money being spent in judicial elections on both the actual and perceived
203impartiality of the judiciary.
The West Virginia statute notes that "[c]urrent campaign finance
laws permit certain independent parties to raise and spend unlimited
amounts of money to influence the outcome of elections."2 04 This, and
205
the expenditures that were at issue in Caperton, suggest that West
Virginia considers both contributions and expenditures from independent
groups to be detrimental to the actual impartiality of the judiciary and its
206
appearance of impartiality to the public. In order to achieve the interest
of an impartial judiciary, West Virginia enacted a matching fund
201. Id; see also Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 52.
202. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(9) (LexisNexis 2011).
203. Id.
204. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(2).
205. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872-76 (2009). It
was the Court's concern for the three million dollars in independent expenditures,
rather than the one thousand dollar contribution that was really at issue in Caperton.
Id. See also Sample, supra note 23, at 729.
206. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(7)-(8) ("As spending by candidates and
independent parties increases, so does the perception that contributors and interested
third parties hold too much influence over the judicial process. The detrimental
effects of spending large amounts by candidates and independent parties are
especially problematic in judicial elections because impartiality is uniquely
important to the integrity and credibility of courts."). See also Messina, supra note
35.
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provision similar to North Carolina's matching fund provision207 that
simply provided for the right to respond. Matching funds were triggered
when either: (1) a privately-financed candidate spent money that was
above the threshold (perhaps when a contribution was made, perhaps
not); (2) when an independent expenditure was made in support of the
privately-financed candidate; or (3) when an independent expenditure
208
was made against the publicly financed candidate. As stated, the
language of the statute suggests that the legislature sees both
contributions and independent expenditures as adversely affecting the
209impartiality or the appearance of the impartiality of the judiciary.
Note, however, that neither the West Virginia legislature nor the
North Carolina legislature attempted to limit or prohibit the speech of
these independent groups.2 10 In fact, neither the concern nor effect was to
equalize funds.21 Rather, the goal was to ensure an impartial judiciary
through the right to respond.2 12 Although the Court states in Bennett that
this right to respond is not protected, and in fact makes such speech more
207. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT § 163-278.67 (2011), with W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-12-11(e)-(g) (LexisNexis 2011). But see Election Law & Policies: Notice, supra
note 11; Messina, supra note 35.
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-11(e)-(g). But
see Election Law & Policies: Notice, supra note 11; Messina, supra note 35.
209. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(7). See
also Sample, supra note 23, at 728.
210. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(2) ("Current campaign finance laws
permit certain independent parties to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money to
influence the outcome of elections.").
211. See Bopp & Neeley, supra note 16, at 215 (arguing that North Carolina's
provision of rescue funds does not achieve equality in terms of dollars spent because
the matching funds are not triggered if a group makes an independent expenditure in
support of a publicly funded candidate or opposing his privately-funded opponent,
but are triggered if a group speaks in favor of the privately-financed candidate or
against the publicly funded candidate). Also, most matching funds schemes only
allow for the allotment of matching funds up to two or three times. Id. at 216.
212. See N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam)) (claiming
that "the distribution of these funds 'furthers, not abridges, pertinent First
Amendment values' by ensuring that the participating candidate will have an
opportunity to engage in responsive speech"). See also Chemerinsky, supra note
161, at 732-34.
536 [Vol. 10
effective,2 13 this result is much less favorable in the context of judicial
214
elections. This right to respond during judicial elections serves a
compelling interest in preserving the impartiality or the appearance of
impartiality of the judiciary both during the election and once elected. As
such, matching funds should survive strict scrutiny because the
consequences of not providing them outweigh the potential burden of
choice independent groups may have to make about whether to spend
during a campaign.
III. RAMIFICATIONS
A. Shifting the Burden to Judicial Candidates
The Court noted in Bennett that "the burden imposed by the
matching funds provision is evident and inherent in the choice that
confronts privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups." 2 15 A group faced with such a choice "can either opt to change its
message from one addressing the merits of the candidates to one
addressing the merits of an issue, or refrain from speaking altogether."216
And to force "that choice-trigger matching funds, change your
message, or do not speak-certainly contravenes the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message." 2 17 Thus, the Court was
concerned with the choice those in the electorate would face, not the
candidates themselves.218 As such, the Court neglects to consider the
imposition and burden the candidates themselves may face in not being
able to choose the content of their own messages.
213. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, U.S.
,__ 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2824 (2011).
214. See Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 52 (noting that courts
should uphold restrictions on both expenditures and contributions "as essential to
ensur[ing] fairness and due process of law").
215. Bennett, U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2823.
216. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2819-20.
217. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 US 557, 573 (1995)).
218. Id.
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While these choices may certainly prove to be burdensome in the
context of judicial elections as well, the burden of choice is also double-
sided. By removing these matching funds in judicial elections, it
essentially shifts the burden of this choice from those expending on
behalf of the campaign to those running in the campaign. 2 19 Removing
matching funds also forces weighing the First Amendment right of
freedom of speech with the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
220
an impartial judiciary.
Without matching funds, and thus the right to respond, judges
facing significant independent expenditures either against them or for
their opponent are faced with three equally unappealing and
undemocratic options:
(1) subtly and sometimes not so subtly signaling a
favorable disposition towards other organized,
concentrated interests-a clear abdication of the
ideals of the judicial role; (2) the daunting and
statistically almost impossible specter of raising
enough money to meaningfully counter the funded
speech-even inaccurate funded speech without
engaging in option (1); or (3) surrender-often
before ever entering a race at all.221
Forcing judges and judicial candidates to make these choices subjects
them to a greater burden than that faced by the groups in Bennett, and
has much wider and detrimental consequences to the candidates running
and the potential litigants.
219. See Barak Y. Orbach & Frances R. Sjoberg, Excessive Speech, Civility
Norms, and the Clucking Theorem, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (2011) ("Put simply,
the majority in Davis and Bennett opposed regulatory schemes that added speech,
based on the theory that the additional speech, or clucking, is a burden that
diminishes the effectiveness of existing speech. The majority dismissed the
possibility that some of the existing speech, the privately funded speech, could be
the source of burdensome clucking, and that establishing greater vocal parity may
mitigate the symptoms.").
220. See Mary Eileen Weicher, Comment, The Expansion of the First
Amendment in Judicial Elections: Another Cause for Reform, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
833, 835 (2007) (noting that "the states' interests in preserving the reality and
perception of judicial impartiality must be balanced against the weight of the First
Amendment").
221. Sample, supra note 23, at 756 (footnote omitted).
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Not allowing for matching funds also forces a judge to make a
choice: either accept public funding and have the appearance of an
222impartial campaign, and thus an impartial court, or lose. When faced
with the choice of accepting public funding and not being able to
formulate a response, or privately funding one's campaign and ensuring
the right to respond if necessary, any candidate will likely choose the
223latter. After all, who wants to engage in a competitive campaign with
"no corresponding means of reply?" 224 A reliance on "independent"
groups may result, not because judges like being susceptible to the
221
control of independent groups, but because they do not want to lose.
Not only does this choice render the public financing system essentially
226
obsolete, thus removing any source for unbiased funding, it also forces
227judges to participate and engage in a campaign like a politician. This
222. See Bert Brandenburg, Funding Justice: Big Money and Impartial
Justice: Can They Live Together?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 215 (2010) (noting that
"[p]ublic financing reduces the burden on judicial candidates to raise money from
special interests"); see also Patrick Caldwell, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT,
Oct. 2011, at 49 ("Once judges accept campaign donations, impartiality loses any
semblance of legitimacy.").
223. See Crosland, supra note 40, at 1313 ("The primary impediment to
effective administration of Clean Elections has long been the risk of candidates
being deterred from accepting public funds because of the threat of limitless
spending by nonparticipating opponents and, more significantly, independent groups
making hostile [independent expenditures]." (footnote omitted)).
224. Nichol, supra note 14, at 1016.
225. See Crosland, supra note 40, at 1313.
226. See Nichol, supra note 14, at 1016; see also Crosland, supra note 40, at
1313.
227. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Additional Perspectives: Judicial Elections in
the Aftermath of White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 53 ADVOC. 78, 78 (2010),
available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate Vol 53
Winter_2010.pdf (noting that judicial elections are thought to politicize judges
because "they lead judicial candidates to commit themselves to deciding future cases
in particular ways; candidates receive campaign support so substantial as to appear
beholden to their supporters; and incumbents are put at risk of losing their tenure for
being affiliated with an unpopular political party, for invalidating unconstitutional
but popular laws, or for upholding the rights of unpopular litigants"); see also
Grimes, supra note 26, at 884 ("In order to get elected, many state supreme court
judges need to raise millions of dollars. To raise that much money, judges must
become politicians and run political campaigns.").
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extreme politicizing of judges is neither the purpose nor the role of the
228judiciary.
The 2010 Iowa Supreme Court election provides a clear example
of the influence and impact money from independent expenditures can
have on judicial elections and the choice judges are now forced to make
about the influence independent groups will have on their campaign and
the resulting appearance of bias of their courts. Although Iowa operates
under the "Missouri Plan" for placing judges on the bench229 as opposed
to the non-partisan primary method used in North Carolina,230 judges
vying for a seat on the Iowa Supreme Court are still subject to
elections.231 The "Missouri Plan," also known as the "merit plan," 23 2
involves a process by which the Governor appoints judges from a list of
candidates put forth by an independent nominating committee.233 After
certain periods of time, the public then votes in retention elections on
234
whether the judges appointed by the Governor should remain in office.
The independent committee is a panel of fifteen that consists of seven
members selected by the Governor, seven members of the bar
235
association, and a sitting state supreme court justice. During the
interview, panelists are forbidden from asking the nominee about his or
her political ideology, thus attempting to keep the judiciary de-
236politicized. Once selected by the committee, the nominee is placed on
the ballot for the upcoming election and is up for "reelection" every eight
237
years.
228. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 805-07 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Caldwell, supra note 222, at 50.
229. See Caldwell, supra note 222, at 46.
230. See Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The
North Carolina Experience and the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1965, 1967 (2011).
231. Caldwell, supra note 222, at 46 ("Supreme court justices go on the ballot
at the first general election after they are selected and every eight years after.").
232. See Moenius, supra note 122, at 1105.
233. Id at 1105-06.
234. Id. at 1106.
235. See Caldwell, supra note 222, at 46.
236. See id.
237. See id
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Until recently, these retention elections for the judiciary had
been anticlimactic, inexpensive, and non-political events.238 However,
after the influx of money from independent groups, judicial elections
became highly publicized, expensive, and political affairs.239 Thus, the
judges in Iowa are still confronted with the same issues and concerns
under the "Missouri Plan" as they would be in a non-partisan judicial
election like North Carolina holdS24 0 because, although the candidates
may be initially appointed, they must still "face the electorate to confirm
their nomination."241
The influence of independent groups in the 2010 Iowa Supreme
Court election was spurred after the Iowa Supreme Court found bans on
242
same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional in Varnum v. Brien. As a
result of the decision, Bob Vander Plaats "spearhead[ed] an effort to
remove" three of the justices who took part in the opinion who were up
243for retention election the following November. Vander Plaats created
an organization called Iowa for Freedom that embodied his evangelical
244
social conservatism. Vander Plaats' anti-retention campaign was
successful due to funding his organization received from the American
245Family Association (AFA). The funding allowed Iowa for Freedom to
begin running TV ads in early September, and "the attacks bombarded
viewers the rest of the fall." 246 One of the most interesting aspects of this
campaign, however, is that AFA was not concerned with these three
particular justices or even the politics of Iowa.247 Rather, AFA used the
campaign to flood money into the election as a method to voice its
opposition to judicial activism: "[s]tate judges would know their jobs
238. See id.
239. See id. at 48-50.
240. See Carrington, supra note 230, at 1966 n.1 (explaining the process of
how North Carolina elects its judges and how that process came to be for each level
of the judiciary).
241. See Rotunda, supra note 92, at 7.
242. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
243. See Caldwell, supra note 222, at 47.
244. See id. at 46-47.
245. See id. at 47-48.
246. See id. at 48.
247. See id.
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would be at stake when they ruled against the values social conservatives
cherished." 24 8
After three of his fellow justices lost their reelections due to the
influence exerted by Vander Plaats and his organization, Justice David
Wiggins, another justice from the Varnum opinion, is up for reelection in
2012.249 Justice Wiggins is now faced with the possibility of having to
form a campaign committee and actively campaign for his reelection
against Vander Plaats and other possible opposition groups.250 The
Justice realizes that by not launching response campaigns, his former
colleagues "'took the position that judges should not get involved in
politics[,]"'251 and that they "'maintained their integrity."'252 But as a
253
result, these three justices lost their jobs. Thus, Justice Wiggins is now
faced with a choice to either campaign like a politician, or lose.254
Because Iowa does not have a matching funds provision (or public
financing),255 Justice Wiggins must form his own campaign committee to
combat the ads that will presumably be run by Vander Plaats and hope
there are other groups who will be willing to provide both contributions
and independent expenditures on his behalf25 6 in order to be heard by
voters. If Justice Wiggins does not campaign, Vander Plaats may then
run ads like he did against the previous justices, and "portray [Justice
,,257Wiggins] any way he want[s]. But if Justice Wiggins was afforded
the right to respond, he would be able to run commercials and explain to
voters who he is and what he stands for, combating any messages about
248. Id.
249. Id. at 50.
250. See id. (noting that there is an Iowa rule that a justice cannot campaign
unless there is an active opposition, giving Justice Wiggins some time. But the
recent results indicate that opposition from a real candidate need not exist, just
independent groups who oppose a particular justice or candidate).
251. Id. (quoting Justice Wiggins).
252. Id. (quoting Justice Wiggins).
253. See id.
254. See id. at 50.
255. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 68A.202, 301 (West 2011) (indicating when and
from whom judicial candidates may collect campaign funds, and not mentioning any
funds provided from the state).
256. See Caldwell, supra note 222, at 50. While this situation may be an
argument for public funding of judicial elections in general, it strengthens the
justification for matching funds as well.
257. Id.
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him that Vander Plaats may portray,258 without having to rely on others
to respond for him or surrender his spot on the bench without a fight.
The happenings in the Iowa Supreme Court election are
comparable to the possibilities judges in North Carolina will now face.259
No matching funds were needed in the 2004 elections for either North
Carolina's Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.260 '[B]ecause the
[matching funds] gave our candidates the ability to respond to special
interest attacks from the political left and right, . . . many groups stayed
out of North Carolina because they knew that our candidates . . . had the
resources to fight back and set the record straight.'" 2 6 1 However, an
262
influx of independent group advertisements arose in the 2006 election.
Justice Sarah Parker's opponent spent more than the allotted scheme,
263
resulting in the issuance of trigger funds to Justice Parker. Justice
264Parker went on to win the election, despite being outspent , suggesting
that the right to respond helped Justice Parker win because she could
have either clarified misrepresentations or given the appearance of an
impartial campaign by accepting state funding to respond.
However, without the matching funds, judges have not only
potentially lost the right to respond, but they have also lost the potential
258. See id. Although the Justices who were not retained did not campaign at
all, "if [they] had responded to the attacks-introduced themselves to voters on TV,
planted yard signs-they wouldn't have been the disembodied figures voters could
so easily dismiss." Id
259. See Election Law & Policies: Notice, supra note 11 (stating that because
of the Court's decision in Bennett, matching funds will not be distributed for judicial
elections in 2012); see also Paul D. Carrington, NC voters don't wantjudgeships for
sale, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 8, 2012, http://www2.joumalnow.com/news/2012/jan
/08/wsopinO2-paul-d-carrington-guest-columnist-informe-ar-1788184/
(suggesting that because of the loss of matching funds, NC elections will be
comparable to those of other states that are subject to multi-million dollar campaigns
that put justice up for sale).
260. See Carrington, supra note 230, at 2004.
261. Id. at 2004-05 (quoting Chris Heagarty, former executive director of the
N.C. Center for Voter Education).
262. See id. at 2006.
263. See id.
264. Id.
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to give the perception of impartial courts.265 Without these matching
funds, judges will be burdened with the choice of either giving the
appearance of uninfluenced campaigns, and thus impartial courts (and
266
also increasing the likelihood of an actual impartial court), or losing.
Thus, in order to provide for the appearance of an impartial judiciary and
the absence of corruption in the courtroom, there need to be protections
for the appearance of an impartial judiciary and the absence of corruption
during the campaign.267
B. Controlling the Voice of the Law
Politicizing the courts subjects the judiciary to the control of
outside influences in another way. The choice judges must now make, to
"change your message, or . . . not [to] speak,"2 68 is comparable to the
269burden faced by the independent groups in Bennett. However, this
burden is much more problematic because it forces judicial candidates to
make an additional choice: have views that independent groups will
likely support, or lose.270 Thus, without matching funds, judicial
candidates must forego their First Amendment right to control what they
want to say in hopes of attracting support from independent groups in
order to support their campaigns.21 This creates the possibility for the
265. See McKoski, supra note 13, at 368 ("The influence of special-interest
money on judicial elections may be the greatest threat to the public's continued trust
in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.").
266. See also Carrington, supra note 230, at 2004-06.
267. See Caldwell, supra note 222, at 50 (quoting former Justice Streit, who
noted that when judges get involved with politics, "'[they] get labeled' by
themselves or by others, and then must live up to those labels). Although Justice
Streit was speaking about the politicization of judges generally, the same argument
may be applied to situations in which there is no right to respond. Judges who are
not able to correctly "label" themselves will be forced to wear the label given to
them by independent groups. See id
268. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, _ U.S. ,
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2820 (2011).
269. See id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2820.
270. See Rotunda, supra note 92, at 28.
271. See Youn, supra note 118, at 6 ("Mere awareness of a corporation's
potential general treasury fund war chest can be expected to affect the decision-
making of elected officials in ways that will often be difficult to trace.").
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emergence of a "judge with a vision,"272 or "the social-engineering judge
,,273
with an agenda, in several ways. First, it may be relatively easy for
judges to find "independent" groups or rely "independently" on groups
who support their views to support their campaigns.274 If not, the judge
can easily adopt such views-subjecting the judiciary to the views of
275
whoever is willing to pay. This is not the purpose or function of the
276judiciary.
277As already discussed, the Court held in White that the First
Amendment applies to protect the rights of judicial candidates to express
278
their views on disputed legal issues during a campaign. Although the
Court made a distinction between discussion of legal issues and
promissory statements,279 after Citizens United, this creates the problem
of potential "implied promise[s]."2 80 When judicial candidates issue
statements regarding how previous courts have ruled or their views on
legal issues, the statements are technically considered "nonpromissory"
281
and thus protected by the First Amendment under White. However, if a
corporation agrees with this view, it now has the power under Citizens
United to make independent expenditures either in support of this
272. Garrett Epps, Beware: Judges with a Vision, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2011, at
40.
273. Id. at 42. Although Epps writes speaking specifically about the court-
packing of the Supreme Court and the results in social changes or the freezing of the
status quo, the term has implications in elected state judges as well. See id.
274. See Rotunda, supra note 92, at 70 ("Judges, of course, want to preserve
their 'independence.' Yet, when judges decide billion-dollar class actions or decide
hot-button social issues like gay marriage or drug policy, it should be no surprise
that deep-pocketed individuals .. . or entities . .. are drawn to the judicial campaign
like flies to sugar.").
275. See Grimes, supra note 26, at 884 ("The broad free speech protections
granted by White came at a convenient time, for they enable judicial candidates to
send targeted messages to special interests letting them know that the judicial
candidate may be counted on. Special interest groups are unlikely to gamble with
unknown commodities, giving candidates further incentives to announce, pledge, or
promise their intended behavior from the bench.").
276. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 805-07 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
277. See supra Section I.A.
278. See White, 536 U.S. at 788.
279. See id. at 778-81.
280. Moenius, supra note 122, at 1130.
281. See id at 1126.
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282
candidate or against his or her opponent. This indirectly ties the
corporation and its views to those of the candidate, creating both a
misperception that will affect how voters will vote and how they will
283perceive the partiality of the judicial candidate. It must be
remembered, however, that the Court does not consider bias in terms of a
284preconception towards a legal view to be a compelling state interest.
Thus, it is the perceived bias towards the corporation as a party resulting
from the independent ads that creates the assumed partiality. As such, the
right to respond to clarify the judge's stance on the issue, in turn,
alleviates the perceived bias by distancing the judge from the
corporation. Preserving this impartiality from the corporation as a party
285
suffices as a compelling state interest.
These independent ads are a greater concern after Bennett
because, without the right to respond, judicial candidates no longer have
the chance to combat these expenditures or separate themselves from the
286
views of the independent group or corporation. If a publicly financed
candidate does not have the funds to respond, he is forced to make
another choice: either attract "independent" groups who share his views
to respond through expenditures on his behalf,287 or leave his views
288
unsaid. Without the right to respond, independent ads could potentially
282. Seeid.atll30.
283. See Orbach & Sjoberg, supra note 219, at 46 (noting that the most likely
effects of "clucking," or the additional privately-funded speech are to stifle and
confuse public discourse).
284. See White, 536 U.S. at 777.
285. See id. at 775.
286. See Orbach & Sjoberg, supra note 219, at 46 (claiming that the second-
best solution to the confusion and misinformation in public discourse would be "to
diminish clucking's effectiveness with more speech"). But, the reasoning and
holdings of Citizens United, Davis, and Bennett are "inconsistent with the goal of
fostering healthy public debate" in that they prohibit the entry of more speech. See
id
287. See Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1299-1301 (noting that such support may
also create perception of bias and due process problems if the candidate is elected).
288. But see Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, _ U.S.
,, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2824 (2011) (arguing that "an advertisement supporting
the election of a candidate that goes without a response is often more effective than
an advertisement that is directly controverted").
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misconstrue not only what the law is, but also how a judge will interpret
it.289
"'Campaigns go to great lengths to develop precise messages
and strategies. An insensitive or ham-handed ad campaign by an
independent third party might distort the campaign's message or cause a
backlash against the candidate, even though the candidate was not
responsible for the ads."' 29 0 If the expenditures are truly independent,
neither the candidate they advocate for nor the candidate they oppose has
control over what is being said.291 These expenditures essentially indicate
to the electorate how the judicial candidate would or would not rule on
an issue once on the bench, but without the candidate actually expressing
292those views. Thus, without the right to respond, a candidates does not
have the chance to correct the potential misconceptions, creating the
perception of a biased campaign when, in fact, it may not be.293
Politicizing the judiciary to this extent also creates the possibility
for a "judge with a vision"294 il other ways as well. Aside from the
concern that judges will shape their views so as to gain financial support,
such politicizing also creates a risk that judges will use their courtroom
as a platform. In order to gain support, judicial candidates may be forced
to make statements during the campaign that are considered
"nonpromissory,"295 but that are couched in terms so as to gain support
289. See Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1335 ("The form of bias likely to arise
from interest-group support, then, is likely to be a perceived inclination toward a
particular legal or political position.").
290. Rotunda, supra note 92, at 47 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, _, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2273 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
291. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910
(2010) ("By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech presented to
the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.").
292. See Rotunda, supra, note 92, at 47 (commenting on the situation from
Caperton in which once a company executive made his independent expenditures to
a judge who later heard a case involving the company, there was little that either
judicial candidate could do about it); see also Moenius, supra note 122, at 1130.
293. See Orbach & Sjoberg, supra note 219, at 43 n.241 (arguing that the
"privately funded speech could divert attention from important issues or confuse
voters without any corrupt motives").
294. See Epps, supra note 272, at 41.
295. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002); see
also Moenius, supra note 122, at 1130.
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296from independent groups or corporations. Such statements also
indirectly tie the judicial candidate to the group that made the
expenditure, creating a sense of "indebtedness [that] judges naturally will
feel towards those corporations and organizations that make substantial
expenditures on the judicial candidate's behalf."2 97 Also, even if the
judge did not technically promise anything to these groups in exchange
for support, this creates additional problems if the groups think the judge
did, and so support the candidate or oppose his adversary, either
explicitly or implicitly,298 expecting something in return.299
First, by politicizing judicial elections to this extent, it creates the
problem that the judge feels indebted to these corporations and thus rules
in their favor.3m Although the Court has continually held that
independent expenditures do not result in corruption or the appearance of
corruption because such expenditures are supposedly organized without
the candidate knowing,3 0 1 few judicial candidates will be oblivious to the
reality that a group or individual has spent on their behalf.302 This
296. See Moenius, supra note 122, at 1129-30.
297. Id. at 1131.
298. See Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1335 ("In theory, there is no reason that
endorsements-particularly by a large group-cannot create the same type of 'debt
of gratitude' that was of concern in Caperton."). Unlike North Carolina's provision
for matching funds, Wisconsin's provision did not provide additional funds to a
candidate participating in the public funding if advertisements in support of his or
her opponent were paid for by independent groups. See James Sample, Court Reform
Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787, 804 (2010). As a result, "the
majority of the television advertising in the state's court races" were sponsored by
independent groups. Id.
299. See Moenius, supra note 122, at 1130 (noting the possibility that if a
judge makes a statement on his or her stance on an issue, independent groups and
corporations may create advertisements for or against that judge, turning a
nonpromissory campaign statement into an implied promise).
300. See Susman, supra note 110, at 364.
301. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
302. It is also possible that the converse is true. If judges are not oblivious to
who makes certain expenditures on his behalf, the judge is also not oblivious to who
makes expenditures against him. Thus, the due process rights of the group or
individual who was able to exercise their First Amendment right against the election
of the judge, may also be in jeopardy not because the judge would be biased in their
favor, but because the judge may be biased against them. See Esenberg, supra note
60, at 1336 ("The potential for apparent impropriety or an unacceptable probability
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"debt of gratitude" that may be owed to, at least,
the support of an independent group representing a
particular interest or point of view (as opposed to,
as Justice Kennedy seemed to see it, being virtually
an alter ego of a particular party with a private
interest) is indistinguishable from the type of
pressure that may flow from a judge's recognition
of who supports her and how those supporters'
behavior may impact future elections. 303
Thus, when the judge arrives on the bench, "the indebtedness and
dependence judges may feel to corporations and organizations that quite
obviously had a lot to do with putting those judges on the bench," 304
means that these "independent" groups wield control over both who
decides the law and how it is decided.30 5 Moreover, if a candidate had to
make a statement during the campaign to gain support and get elected,
once on the bench, the "temptation to avoid contradicting a campaign
statement will be almost automatic-regardless of impartiality
considerations." 306
Second, organizations may think that the judge promised them
something and may threaten to withhold support or advocate for the
judge's opponent in the next election if the judge does or did not rule in
the organization's favor. 30 7 Thus, judges may be hesitant to contradict the
statement that resulted in this kind of support for fear of the withdrawal
of that support.30 8 In addition to the possibility that judges will decide
of bias is just as likely to stem from opposition to a judge as from support for a
judge.").
303. Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1334.
304. Moenius, supra note 122, at 1131.
305. See id. at 1124 ("This unregulated power to expend endless amounts of
money to ensure that a particular candidate is put on the bench, combined with the
substantial deterioration of judicial campaign speech regulations, allows
corporations to buy promises of partial decisions, and thus nearly erases the minimal
independence left in the elected judiciary."); see also supra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text.
306. Moenius, supra note 122, at 1132.
307. See Youn, supra note 118, at 5 (recounting the facts of Caperton to show
an "example in which an independent expenditure ad campaign unseated an elected
official who was at odds with a corporate agenda").
308. See Moenius, supra note 122, at 1131.
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cases in favor of those who helped get them elected, there is also the risk
that judges will decide cases because they do not want to alienate
potential donors. 309 Corporations can now control judges by proclaiming:
either rule in the way that best benefits our company, or we will run ads
that favor your opponent.3o The fact that corporations can wield the
power in determining how a judge comes out on a matter of law not only
when they are before the court, but also when ruling a certain way could
have a detrimental impact on their business, is not the function of the
311judiciary.
These concerns clearly implicate the Court's definition of
"impartiality" as "the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding"3 12 that is a sufficient compelling state interest.313 The
indebtedness the judge either explicitly feels or implicitly indicates
suggests that the judge does and will favor the party that contributed to
his or her campaign once that party arrives in court.
Moreover, these concerns are not nearly as problematic in the
context of political elections because of the inherent nature of the
314political system. Voters expect politicians to be in favor of a certain
issue or viewpoint precisely because of their ideology that they professed
during the election. 315 This expectation is part of the democratic system;
309. See id
310. See Nichol, supra note 14, at 1011.
311. See Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1296-97 (noting that it is unclear from
Caperton whether a judge must recuse himself if the campaign support came from
an advocacy or interest group, or whether the rule of recusal only applies when the
supporter is a particular litigant).
312. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
313. Id.
314. See Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 20, at 51 (noting that "a legislator
is not disqualified from voting on a bill that benefits those who spent a great deal of
money for his or her election"); see also Caldwell, supra note 222, at 50 ("It's
essential for voters to know what kinds of policies a politician would pursue.").
315. See Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Rethinking "Bias ": Judicial Elections and the
Due Process Clause After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 64 ARK. L. REV. 179,
198 (2011) (noting that elected officials consider "which course of action is most
consistent with the ideological commitments and policy goals of their constituents").
Sandberg-Zakian also notes that consideration of career aspirations and reelection
prospects is recognized in political elections, and that these considerations are often
weighed when making decisions consistent with the ideologies and policy goals of
their constituents. Id.
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voters understand that majority wins, and so then the majority's
316
viewpoint controls. While this may influence how the law is crafted, it
should not determine who wins under it.317
Thus, not only will the expenditures from these independent
groups in effect determine who will interpret the law,318 but it also
suggests that they determine how it will be interpreted.319 Although
people elect representatives and senators to further their views and craft
laws expressing those views, "'[i]t is not up to the people to determine
what our Constitution means."'320 'If that were the case, we would not
have integrated schools, we would not have integrated lunch counters,
we would not have women voting. All those civil rights pioneered by the
courts, if they were left up to the people, would be different."'321 Thus,
while individuals and independent groups no doubt have the right to
spend money through independent expenditures to express their views
about what they think the law should be,322 they should not have the
unfettered right to determine what interpretation prevails.323 As Justice
Ginsburg noted in her dissent in White, "even when [judges] develop
common law or give concrete meaning to constitutional text, judges act
316. See White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In a democracy,
issues of policy are properly decided by majority vote.").
317. See Moenius, supra note 122, at 1125 (noting that it is possible "from a
'consumer' standpoint, it would be cheaper to purchase a few judges than it would
be to buy an entire legislature").
318. See id. at 1131 (remarking that the influx of independent expenditures
means that "not only will special interests be deciding races but they will be deciding
law").
319. See generally Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan
Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions & Judicial
Decision, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 100 (2011) (empirical analysis finding statistically
significant relationship between campaign contributions and judicial decisions in
favor of contributors' interests in partisan elections). But under this analysis, the
effects could be the same for expenditures.
320. Caldwell, supra note 222, at 50 (quoting Justice Michael Streit, one of the
justices ousted in the lowa retention election).
321. Id. (quoting Justice Streit). This raises a different aspect of judicial
activism that, while not at issue in this Note, plays into the context of the judges
acting to get a certain result for a certain litigant.
322. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1976) (per curiam); see also
Rotunda, supra note 92, at 58.
323. See Caldwell, supra note 222, at 50.
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only in the context of individual cases, the outcome of which cannot
depend on the will of the public."324 Thus, while "[1]egislative and
executive officials act on behalf of the voters who placed them in office;
'judges represent the [f]aw."' 3 25 As such, the right to respond in judicial
elections is crucial so as to combat the perception that these outside
influences now control both who makes the law and who wins under
it.326
C. Shifting the Burden to Potential Litigants
Even if these expenditures in support of a candidate are actually
independent, the problem of "implied promises" still exists in the eyes of
the voters. 327 These expenditures essentially indicate to the electorate
how the judicial candidate would or would not rule on an issue once on
328
the bench. Thus, even if a judge claims to be impartial, how impartial a
judge says that he or she is or will be is not always relevant.329 Rather,
what matters is how impartial those judges appear in court to the litigants
opposing the groups who made the expenditures.330
A poll conducted earlier this year by Justice at Stake, a non-
partisan Washington, D.C. based campaign working to keep state and
324. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 806 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 803 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 411 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
326. See Hasen, supra note 47, at 1003 ("Independent spending favoring
officeholders (or attacking their opponents) can help spenders curry favor with
elected officials, and legislative actions therefore may be skewed toward the interests
of the big spenders. This is a distortion of legislative rather than electoral
outcomes.").
327. Moenius, supra note 122, at 1130.
328. Id.
329. See White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Even if judges
were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere possibility that judges' decisions
may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to
undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary."); see also Sample, supra note
23, at 775.
330. See Sample, supra note 23, at 775 (arguing that the perspective of the
individual litigant is the most fundamental structural characteristic distinguishing the
courts from the legislative and executive branches).
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federal courts fair and impartial,33 ' and the N.C. Center for Voter
Education revealed how North Carolinians generally perceived the effect
of contributions to judges during their campaign on the outcomes of
court cases. 332 The poll revealed that forty-three percent of the people
polled believed that campaign contributions greatly impact the later
rulings of judges. 333 The poll also showed that eighty-five percent
believed that judges should disqualify themselves when contributions
334have been made in support of or against the judge hearing the case.
The poll also found that forty-eight percent of individuals believed that
public funding of judicial elections reduced corruption. 3 3 5
This poll reveals several interesting perceptions about judicial
elections in North Carolina and how North Carolinians view these
elections. First, in the eyes of North Carolinians, bias equals
336
corruption. Second, these numbers indicate that almost half of North
Carolinians think their judges could potentially be biased, but that they
believe public financing can solve this problem.337 As noted previously,
without matching funds, the public financing system is essentially
rendered obsolete.33 Third, while the poll only specifically asks about
contributions, it is likely that few voters would actually know whether an
ad in support of or against a judicial candidate that was paid for by a
corporation qualified as a direct contribution or independent
expenditure. 3 39 Thus, if voters see ads run in support or opposition to a
331. See Justice at Stake's Mission, JUSTICE AT STAKE, http://www.
justiceatstake.org/about/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
332. North Carolina Registered Voter Survey, JUSTICE AT STAKE (Feb. 22,
2011), http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfin/media/cms/ql65_frelimited
release 9E72F4684EB8B.pdf.
3 3 3. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See Press Release, N.C. Voters: Campaign Contributions Influence Court
Rulings, N.C. CTR. FOR VOTER EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2011), http://ncvotered.com/research
/2011/2 22 1 ljudicialpoll.php.
337. Id. ("'Voters believe that giving judicial candidates an alternative to
special-interest money to fund their campaigns is key to protecting the integrity of
our courts."' (quoting Damon Circosta, executive director of the N.C. Center for
Voter Education)).
338. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
339. Although ads may state "paid for by" a certain company that still creates
an indirect connection for the voter.
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candidate that are paid for by independent groups or corporations, voters
are likely to assume the connection between the candidate and the
corporation, regardless of the actual form of spending. 3 40 This assumed
connection might influence not only how voters vote,341 but also how
they perceive the judge both during the election and once on the
bench.342
Without matching funds for judicial elections, the burden of
choice also shifts to the potential litigants facing those who made
contributions or expenditures in judicial elections.343 Thus, by not
allowing states to burden these groups because of the choice they must
make in deciding whether to speak or not, they impose burdens on
litigants who must choose: bring suit and face the risk of bias, or do not
bring suit at all. This situation reflects the "openmindedness" definition
of impartiality the Court discussed in White.3" Although the Court notes
that defining impartiality to describe "openmindedness" is not
common,34 5 the Court acknowledges "impartiality in this sense, and the
appearance of it, are desirable in the judiciary." 346 The Court considers
"openmindedness" as the willingness of a judge to "consider views that
340. See Carrington, supra note 230, at 1984-85.
341. Moenius, supra note 122, at 1131 ("Because the general public knows
little about judicial qualifications, an uninformed citizen is likely-when choosing
between two judicial candidates she knows little about-to vote for the judge she
remembers seeing the insurance company's advertisements for, or maybe even more
understandably, not vote for the judge she saw advertisements against.").
342. See Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1299-1301.
343. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002); see
also Grimes, supra note 26, at 884 (noting that because judicial candidates must
cultivate constituent, and thus donor relationships, in order to keep their jobs, "a
combination of bias-creating (but protected) speech and bias-ensuring (but legal)
campaign money, litigants on the wrong side of a state supreme court majority often
do not stand a chance"). This presents the image of favoring the wealthy, as people
perceive justice can be bought and is thus only available for those who can afford it.
See Nichol, supra note 14, at 1016-17.
344. See White, 536 U.S. at 766.
345. Id
346. Id. The Court rejected the definition of impartiality as "openmindedness"
with respect to the announce clause in White because they did not think "the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose." Id. at 778.
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oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion." 34 7
Additionally, the Court states that this "sort of impartiality seeks to
guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the
case, but at least some chance of doing so." 34 8 The burden potential
litigants face in weighing their probability of justice defeats the purpose
of the judiciary, as a potential litigant with a viable claim may decide not
to bring suit because she thinks she does not have a chance given what
349
was said about the judge's views during the campaign. Moreover, a
situation where a judicial candidate is left without the right to respond is
even more problematic because the potential litigant may base such a
decision on information provided by interest groups, not the candidate.
Furthermore, under the Court's standard for proving the burden
on one's First Amendment right in Bennett,350 one would not even have
to prove that he or she actually did not bring suit because of fear of
bias.' Just the fact that a potential litigant was faced with the choice of
whether to bring the suit and risk bias, or not bring it at all, would deem
352that choice an unjustifiable burden. Such a choice is far more
burdensome in that it potentially deprives the potential litigant of the
right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal under due process of law before they
even get to the courtroom. This is perhaps the most problematic
consequence of losing the right to respond because it begs the question of
347. Id. See also Esenberg, supra note 60, at 1318 (noting that there is a sense
"in which we believe that a judge ought to be open to argument and willing to
change her mind").
348. White, 536 U.S. at 778.
349. See Grimes, supra note 26, at 884.
350. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, U.S. ,
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2823 (2011).
351. See id. ("While there is evidence to support the contention of the
candidates and independent expenditure groups that the matching funds provision
burdens their speech, 'it is never easy to prove a negative'-here, that candidates
and groups did not speak or limited their speech because of the Arizona law."
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960))).
352. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2823 ("we do not need empirical evidence to
determine that the law at issue is burdensome"). See also Steven D. Schwin, The
Right to Campaign Without a Response: Analysis of Arizona Free Enterprise,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF. BLOG (June 29, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad
.com/conlaw/campaign-finance/ ("[T]he Court doesn't seem interested in whether
Arizona's public financing system deters speech in fact; it's only interested in
whether it deters speech in its own theory.").
555
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
whether the First Amendment right of speech would trump the
313Fourteenth Amendment right of due process.
Recusal standards cannot solve this problem because, as noted,
the due process rights of potential litigants are not affected unless and
until the litigants are before a judge.354 A judge cannot recuse him or
herself if the case has not yet been brought. Moreover, even if the state
has adopted recusal standards for situations such as this, it does not
ensure that the judge will perceive the presence of a campaign supporter
as a conflict.355 Certain human characteristics, such as reciprocity and
denial, "make it impossible for those judges to recognize threats to their
impartiality, and difficult to recuse themselves as frequently as they
should." 356 "Reciprocity, the often unconscious impulse to return a
favor,"357 and denial, "the inability to confront or even perceive
inconvenient facts,"358 make recusal standards essentially meaningless.
Additionally, the reliance on recusal standards assumes that
potential litigants are aware of the current judicial standards for recusal
and know when a judge will have to recuse himself. If, in fact, the
litigant is not aware of such standards or the ability to have the judge
recused, he or she may refrain from bringing the suit at all or proceed
under a judge whom he or she believes, and perhaps the judge believes as
well, to be impartial. This deprives the litigant of justice before he or she
even gets to the courtroom because of the appearance of a biased
judiciary. As such, the bias that results falls within two of the Court's
definitions of impartiality that are potentially compelling state
353. See Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 315, at 214 (indicating how the
"increased competitiveness of judicial elections and the advent of expensive TV
advertising" raises new due process issues). See also Weicher, supra note 220, at
835.
354. See Grimes, supra note 26, at 878 ("Potential bias toward a litigant or her
cause may only manifest itself in actual cases or controversies.").
355. See Susman, supra note 110, at 360 (noting that society often considers
judges to be "superhuman," expecting them to be above certain flaws).
356. Id. (arguing that the principles of reciprocity and denial create the
probability that judges will be influenced by campaign support from parties and
lawyers before them, no matter the amount, and that any standard of recusal will
likely be inadequate to counter that impartiality).
357. Id.
358. Id.
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interests. 3 59 The burden potential litigants face defeats impartiality as
defined as "the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding"360 and the "openmindedness" of a judge to "consider views
that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion.""' As
such, the biased judiciary that results from losing the right to respond
constitutes a compelling state interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the Court rejects the notion that matching
funds serve a compelling state interest in preventing corruption for
political elections, the same cannot be said for judicial elections.
Although phrased differently, the standards for corruption in political
elections are essentially the same as "bias" and thus fall outside the
definitions of "impartiality." Thus, the matching funds prevent
corruption by preserving the appearance of an impartial judiciary. A
biased judiciary, or the appearance of one, can result from quid pro quo
corruption, or the appearance of it, which arises from direct
contributions, and the corruptive influence of money resulting from
numerous independent expenditures. However, the right to respond
erodes the perception of bias, as judges are able to clarify misperceptions
and create distance from unwanted or potentially bias-creating
connections. Furthermore, independent groups or corporations are still
free to express their views whenever, however, and for whomever they
wish. Matching funds simply provide the judicial candidate with a way to
preserve independence and impartiality, or at least the appearance of it,
in no way without taking speech rights from others. Although these
groups may be burdened by their decision of whether or not to spend,362
that burden does not outweigh the burden faced by judicial candidates
and potential litigants. As such, preserving the right to respond through
matching funds in judicial elections protects both the actual and
perceived impartiality of the judiciary. Not only is this perceived and
359. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-78 (2002).
360. Id. at 775.
361. Id. at 778.
362. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, _ U.S.
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2819-20 (2011).
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actual impartiality a sufficient compelling state interest to survive strict
scrutiny, preserving the impartiality is necessary in light of the influx of
special interest money into judicial elections.
